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I Introduction
From a variety of aspects, several re-
searchers and research groups have under-
taken surveys which included the manage-
ment of the Japanese subsidiaries III
Taiwan. Of these, the following should be
mentioned: Ting-Kuo Chen [1972], Anant
R. Negandhi [1973J, Japan Institute of
Labor [1975J, Tsai-lVIei Lin [1977], Hajime
Sakai [1980], and Hideo Ishida [1984].1)
Chen, Negandhi, and Lin were all compar-
ing the management of Japanese and
American subsidiaries and of the local
firms in Taiwan, and Lin compared her
results with those of the other two. N e-
gandhi's study is based on interviews and a
questionnaire survey. His questionnaire
sample consists of American and Japanese
subsidiaries and local firms, while the
interview sample consists of the top man-
agers and local workers at the same local
firms and American subsidiaries. Two
surveys were conducted by Sakai. In the
* {jtRilE-, School of Economics, University of
Osaka Prefecture, 4-804 Mozu· U memachi,
Sakai·city, Osaka 591, Japan
1) The size of the samples of the Japan Institute
of Labor's and Ishida's surveys are very limited.
Sakai's article summarizes the results of the
two surveys undertaken by the Institute of
Industrial Relations, Kinki University, where
he is affiliated.
first, in 1976, questionnaires were sent only
to Japanese subsidiaries, but in the second
survey, in 1980, questionnaires were sent to
both Japanese subsidiaries and local firms.
We will not go into the arguments of the
above research here.
In this paper, using the results of a survey
undertaken in Taiwan in November 1983,
I will investigate how Japanese subsidiaries
are introducing and modifying Japanese
style management in the specific local
environment of Taiwan and what its con-
sequences are. This survey is part of a
project concerning the management and
labor relations of Japanese subsidiaries in
Southeast and East Asian countries.
Questionnaires were distributed to 300
Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan through
the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in
Taipei; one questionnaire for Japanese top
managers (in Japanese) and two question-
naires for local middle managers (in
Chinese) were sent to each company. The
former were collected by the Japanese
Chamber of Commerce in Taipei and the
latter by Chi Shieve of Taiwan National
University. The number of completed
questionnaires for Japanese top managers
and local middle managers were 85 and 144,
respectively. Thus, the completion rates
were 28.3<;6 and 24.00/0' respectively. In
November 1983, K. Urabe and I visited
Taiwan and interviewed Japanese top
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managers and local middle managers of
16 Japanese subsidiaries. I shall use the
information from the above interviews
for the following arguments.
In the next section, I will give a brief
description of the economy and labor market
of Taiwan. In section III, I will give a
brief profile of Japanese subsidiaries in
Taiwan. In section IV, I will present and
discuss the answers of the Japanese top
managers of Japanese subsidiaries m
Taiwan, and will compare the answers of
Japanese top managers and local middle
managers. In both sections IV and V,
I will compare the survey results from
Taiwan and those from the ASEAN
countries.
II The Economy and Labor
Market of Taiwan2 )
The recent economic development of
Taiwan is remarkable. For example, the
average annual economic growth rates
between 1963 and 1972 and between 1973
and 1982 are 10.8% and 7.9%' respec-
tively, which are high by world standards
during those periods. Because of the rapid
economic development in Taiwan, especially
the rapid development of manufacturing
industry, excess supply of labor has been
constantly declining, particularly in the
1970s and 1980s, which has caused a rapid
increase in wage rates. For example, the
2) For general description of the economy of
Taiwan, see Taiwan Kenkyusho [1983] and
Koryu Kyokai [1983], and for general de-
scription of the labor market of Taiwan, see
Galenson [1979] and Koryu Kyokai [1982].
nominal wage rate m manufacturing
industry rose by about 165 percentage
points from 1976 through 1982, an average
annual growth rate of the nominal wage
rate of 17.6%. Taiwan had been consid-
ered one of the low labor cost countries, but
now, this impression should be changed,
although the average increase in the real
wage rate, 7.4%, does not exceed the
average annual growth rate of labor pro-
ductivity, 8.9%, during the same period.
Thus, the foreign subsidiaries which
directly invested in Taiwan because of her
low labor costs may be forced to change
their strategies in the near future.
Because of the rapid economic develop-
ment and the increase in the demand for
labor in Taiwan, the unemployment rate
has been fairly low, that is, below 2%
in the second half of the 1970s and 2.18%
in 1982, exceedingly low by U.S. or other
Western countries' standards and even
below that of Japan. Furthermore, labor
mobility is increasing. For instance, ac-
cording to Liu, job mobility rates for male
workers increased from 11.0% to 21.4C)~
from 1975 to 1979, and job mobility rates
for female workers increased 7.2% to 17.5%
in the same period [Liu 1982: 10]. Liu also
mentions that, according to a 1975 survey,
for males the mobility rate increased from
7.5°1<, for the age group 15-19 to a peak of
16.8% for the age group 25-29, then
gradually declined to 6.2% for the age
group 55-59 and that, for females, the
peak occurred earlier, in the age group
20-24, and the corresponding percentages
were 9.5, 11.9, and 2.2 [loco cit.]. He also
says that the 1979 patterns paralleled those
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of 1975, but at higher levels. Note that
64.7% of the total job changes in 1979 are
by quitting [loco cit.]. Furthermore, the
average monthly job separation rates in
manufacturing industry, from 1973 to
1980, ranged from 3.2 to 3.9%' Note that
the average monthly job separation rates
in Japan (of firms with over 30 employees)
from 1978 and 1981 were constant at 1.40/0'
The following brief description of the
labor market in Taiwan depends greatly on
Galenson [Galenson 1979J. According to
the trade union law, a minimum of 50
workers over 20 years of age in an
industrial plant are allowed to organize
a umon. Only one union is permitted in
each plant. The trade union law mandates
all the workers to join the union in the plant
where a union is formed. The trade union
is legally allowed to keep those who do not
join the union away from work until they
join the union. Actually, however, many
of the workers in plants where a union is
formed do not join it, probably because
they are afraid of giving a negative im-
pression to their employers, or because
they are simply not interested in the union.
One of the important features of the
trade unions in Taiwan is that they are
prohibited by law from striking. If there
is trouble between the union and the man-
agement, the workers may go to the central
or local government to complain, and the
problems are usually settled there. Another
important feature of the trade unions
in Taiwan is that they generally cooperate
with management and are not very active.
For example, they rarely demand wage
increases, and only complain to the manage-
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ment when union members complain about
being laid-off or penalized. Furthermore,
the union very often consists not only of the
production workers, but also the office
workers, foremen, engineers, and even the
middle managers, that is, all employees
in the plant except the top management.
Although the trade unions are not ex-
ceedingly active in Taiwan, their number
is constantly increasing, mainly because
the government is currently encouraging
workers to organize, especially in large firms.
I previously discussed the low unemploy-
ment rates and increasing labor mobility
in Taiwan. Surprisingly, except in the
electronics industry, no firm Galenson
interviewed had ever dismissed an employee
except for disciplinary reasons. Even
during the 1974 recession, those firms he
interviewed refrained from hiring workers
from outside and shifted workers to other
jobs, instead of simply laying off workers.
This is likely to be a reflection of the rapid
growth of most firms in Taiwan.
Because of the rapid growth of firms
in Taiwan, hiring workers away from other
companies seems to be a common practice.
According to Galenson, however, the per-
sonnel directors of the 20 factories in an
industrial suburb of Taipei agreed that
they would not attempt to hire one another's
employees, and American firms are said to
refrain from hiring workers from one
another by an arrangement worked out
through the local U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce. Japanese subsidiaries in one local
area are also said voluntarily to refrain
from hiring workers from other Japanese
subsidiaries in that area.
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The role of female workers in the eco-
nomic development of Taiwan, especially
the development of manufacturing industry,
should not be overlooked. For example,
female workers composed only 30.8% of
the national total labor force in January
1976, but their share of the labor force in
manufacturing industry in that month was
46.6%>. Female workers' share of the
national total labor force in 1980 was
33.0% and their share of the labor force
m manufacturing industry 37.8eyo' It
should be noted that, while female workers'
share of the national total labor force is
increasing, their share of the labor force in
manufacturing industry is declining. Fur-
thermore, 46% of female workers were
between 15 and 24 years old in 1975 and
that age group made up 43.9% of female
workers in 1980. The majority of newly
hired female workers in manufacturing
industry seem to be in the above age group
and unskilled. From this evidence, it
may be argued that the role of female
workers in the development of manufactur-
ing industry was considerable, but that
their role in manufacturing industry,
especially, that of young unskilled female
workers, IS gradually declining. This
may indicate that manufacturing industry
in Taiwan is gradually shifting from labor
intensive industries to less labor intensive
ones.
The areas where young unskilled female
workers make up a large part of the work
f~rce include the export processing zones.
Taiwan is the first country in East Asia
where the export processing zones were
established. There are now three export
processing zones in Taiwan. Two are located
in Kaohsiung and one in Taichung. No
tariffs, well established infrastructure, and
other factors are considered the advantages
of the firms operating in export processing
zones. On the other hand, the firms operat-
ing in such zones in Taiwan have the follow-
ing disadvantages, from their own view-
points: the high labor turnover rate in
those zones, no capital gain through
purchasing land, the intervention of the
control centers of the export processing
zones in the management of the firms in
those zones, and the ease with which trade
unions can exchange information within
these zones. The reason why the labor
turnover rate is much higher inside the
export processing zones than outside are that
excess demand for labor exists in those
zones and that workers can easily obtain
a variety of information about hiring, wage
rates, and working conditions of other firms
in the same area. Of course, most of the
above mentioned disadvantages nlay be




Japanese investment in Taiwan started
in 1953 and, according to Kaigai Shinshutsu
Kigyo Soran (1984), there were 478 Japanese
subsidiaries in Taiwan in June 1983. Of
these, 431 (about 90%) are in the manu-
facturing sector. The peaks for the estab-
lishment of Japanese subsidiaries III
Taiwan are 1968 and 1973 (83 Japanese
subsidiaries in 1968 and 88 in 1973) [Koryu
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% in Each Cell 19. 5 13. 4 25. 6 41. 5 100
Table 1 Japanese Equity in Japanese
Subsidiaries in Taiwan
Kaohsiung and Taichung areas are located
in export processing zones.
Generally speaking, the Japanese equity
shares of Japanese subsidiaries are about
50% in the Taipei area, but more likely
to be 100°16 or close to 100% in the
Kaohsiung and Taichung areas. The
Japanese equity share of Japanese sub-
sidiaries is controlled by the government
and mainly depends on the proportion of
the products being exported. The Japanese
equity share of Japanese subsidiaries in
Taiwan, according to our survey, is 74.8°16
on average, which is greater than in the
ASEAN countries, excluding Singapore
where there is little restriction on foreigner's
equity share, except in trading companies.
This figure may reflect the free trade zones
in Taiwan, where most Japanese subsidiaries
are 100% Japanese owned firms. This
can be seen from Table 1. At the early
stage of Japanese direct investment in
Taiwan in the 1960s, foreigner's equity
share was rather free, but is now restricted,
and, as mentioned previously, the maximum
foreign equity share is determined by the
government, depending on what proportion
of its products the firm exports.
Japanese subsidiaries are generally con-
sidered large in Taiwan. Concretely, 45
out of 81, that is, 55.6% of the Japanese
subsidiaries in our survey, are considered
50% - 100% Total
8234No. of Japanese 16 11 21Subsidiaries
Japanese Equity
Kyokai 1983: 39-40]. The 1968 peak was
caused by the completion of the Kaohsiung
Export Processing Zone (EPZ) in 1966 and
the peak in 1973 by Japanese subsidiaries
starting operations, following the completion
of N antze and Taichung EPZ's in 1971.
In our survey, 46.80/0 of our sample started
operations from 1967 through 1971. More-
over, according to Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo
Soran (1984), more than half of the Japanese
subsidiaries in Taiwan invested in Taiwan
because of low labor costs, and more than
one third did so because of the expansion
of the market in Taiwan and third coun-
tries such as Japan, U.S., and Europe.
According to one study, both the average
number of employees of Japanese sub-
sidiaries in Taiwan and the capital thereof
are lower than in U.S. subsidiaries in
Taiwan [Investment Committee 1983].
Furthermore, wage rates 111. Japanese
subsidiaries, many of Japanese top and
local middle managers interviewed by us
think, are lower than that in U.S. sub-
sidiaries by about 20%.
Japanese subsidiaries 111. Taiwan can be
divided into two groups, depending on
their location, that is, either the Taipei
area or the Kaohsiung and Taichung
areas. This separation can be justified
because differences in the labor market and
in the characteristics of Japanese subsid-
iaries in these two areas. The Japanese
subsidiaries in the Taipei area produce
products for the domestic market, while
those in the Kaohsiung and Taichung areas
produce products for foreign markets, such
as Japan, the United States, and Europe.
Many of the Japanese subsidiaries in the
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large firms by Taiwanese standards, that is,
a minimum of one million U.S. dollars
capital. The average capital of Japanese
subsidiaries in our survey is just over two
million U.S. dollars.
The special organizational feature of
Japanese subsidiaries is that, while the
directors are local Chinese, the president is
Japanese and, while the section chiefs are
local Chinese, the president's staff section
is generally made up of Japanese personnel.
Of course, these Japanese personnel oc-
casionally give advice to the section chiefs,
that is, the local middle managers. In
this way, localization is proceeding in the
personnel policy of Japanese subsidiaries.
Group decision-making, which IS a
special feature of Japanese management,
for example management meetings and
section chief meetings, are prevalent m
Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan.
One of the problems of Japanese sub-
sidiaries in Taiwan is the difficulty of
hiring and keeping college graduates and,
as a result, there are not enough qualified
personnel for technology transfer to J apa-
nese subsidiaries m Taiwan. Japanese
subsidiaries have not hired many college
graduates, because they are mainly produc-
tion bases for their mother companies in
Japan so that many college graduates are
not necessary. One of the major reasons
why the college graduates in Japanese
subsidiaries are liable to quit is that they
have difficulty in getting accepted by their
coworkers who are generally older, have
worked for the company longer, and are
non-college graduates.
The labor turnover rates of Japanese
subsidiaries are generally considered to be
rather low by Taiwanese standards, but are,
on average, more than double those of firms
with a minimum of 30 employees in Japan.
Japanese subsidiaries do not usually practice
regular annual hiring, although some do
for female junior or senior high school
graduates, because males are required to
do military service when they become 20
years old, unless they go to college. 3)
Those who go to college are required to do
military service after graduation. Thus,
most Japanese subsidiaries are said to hire
male workers after they finish military
serVIce.
IV The Management of Japanese
Subsidiaries
In this section, I will discuss what type of
management Japanese top managers of
Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan use. First,
I will discuss the localization of Japanese
subsidiaries in Taiwan. Among Japanese
top managers of Japanese subsidiaries in
Taiwan, 78% said that they had adopted
localization as a basic management policy,
while only 22% said that they had adopted
the same policy in Taiwan as in other
countries. The proportion of Japanese
subsidiaries practicing a localization policy
in Taiwan, 78%, is similar to those in the
Philippines and Singapore, and slightly
smaller than those in Thailand, Malaysia,
and Indonesia.
3) One manufacturing company we visited
practices annual regular hiring for senior high
school, polytechnic, and college graduates, but
not for ordinary laborers.
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Localization can be seen in the proportion
of Japanese personnel managers, managers,
and supervisors in Taiwan, that is, 24.0%'
20.9%, and 18.2°!c>, respectively. The pro-
portion of Japanese personnel managers is
similar to those in the Philippines and
Indonesia, and less than those in Singapore,
Malaysia, and Thailand. The proportion
of Japanese managers in Taiwan, 20.9%'
is much smaller than those of most of the
ASEAN countries, except the Philippines,
17.6%. On the other hand, the per-
centage of Japanese supervisors in Taiwan,
18.20/0' is much greater than those in all
the ASEAN countries. For example, the
highest figure for the ASEAN countries is
8.4°!c> in Malaysia. This figure indicates
that localization in Japanese subsidiaries
in Taiwan is progressing more slowly in
terms of supervisors, that is, on the produc-
tion line, than in all ASEAN countries.
From this evidence, it can be argued that
Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan are very
cautious about the localization of production
lines, partly because many Japanese sub-
sidiaries in Taiwan are production bases
for their mother companies in Japan,
partly because they consider quality and
production control two of the most important
factors of their management, and partly
because they may have relatively less
pressure from the local government on
localization in Taiwan than in ASEAN
countries, except Singapore.
The three major problems with local
partners on management policy in Taiwan
concern marketing, personnel policy, and
pricing policy. The marketing policy
problems may often occur when local part-
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ners were originally the local agents for the
products of Japanese companies, because
the interests of Japanese subsidiaries are not
necessarily consistent with those of local
agents in some areas, especially marketing
policy. Pricing policy disagreements may
be another example of the different interests
of Japanese subsidiaries and their local
agents. Personnel management policy prob-
lems may occur when the local partners
introduce nepotism in hiring and promoting
workers. Of course there are certainly a
variety of advantages for Japanese firms in
choosing local agents as partners for their
subsidiaries.
Japanese top managers' Japanese style
management policies of Japanese sub-
sidiaries in Taiwan are ranked as follows:
(1) emphasis on management philosophy
and objectives, 83°!c> , (2) employment
stabilization, 81% , (3) emphasis on smooth
human relations, 71% , (4) the seniority-
based wage system, 45% , (5) the ringi
system, 43%' (6) job rotation, 39°!c> , (7)
little dependence on job manuals, 38°!c> ,
(8) the seniority-based promotion system,
34%' (9) group decision-making, 32%'
(10) the minimization of the status difference
between workers and managers, 30%,
(11) one big office, 29%' and (12) group
responsibility, 220/0'
The emphasis on the management phi-
losophy and objectives of Japanese firms
seems to be influenced by Confucianism.
Thus, they are likely to be very smoothly ac-
cepted by Chinese workers in Taiwan. This
may explain why the proportion of Japanese
subsidiaries adopting this policy in Taiwan
is much higher than in all the ASEAN
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countries. This policy is used to raise the
workers'moral.
The percentage of Japanese subsidiaries
using an employment stabilization policy
in Taiwan, 81%, is similar to those in Singa-
pore and Indonesia and greater than in the
Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand. This
may be because of the high labor turnover
rates in Taiwan. The same thing can be
said for Singapore. In Taiwan, some U.S.
subsidiaries actually laid off workers during
the 1974 recession, while Japanese sub-
sidiaries have seldom laid off workers. Dur-
ing the downturn of the economy, Japanese
subsidiaries asked for voluntary job separa-
tion at most and some have never even
asked this. Instead, they transfer some
workers to other jobs within the same firm.
For example, one Japanese manufacturing
subsidiary in Taipei transferred some of its
workers from the factory to the marketing
section for a couple of months, in order to
promote the sale of their products.
The percentage of Japanese subsidiaries
using the seniority-based wage system in
Taiwan, 450/0' is about the same as the
average for the ASEAN countries. Ac-
cording to Galenson, local firms are gradu-
ally adopting this seniority-based wage
system combined with the merit system,
in order to avoid losing skilled workers
[Galenson 1979: 434J. The percentage of
Japanese subsidiaries using the ringi system
in Taiwan is 43%, which is much higher
than in all the ASEAN countries, because
many local Chinese in their late 40 and 50
working for Japanese subsidiaries can still
read and speak Japanese so that the ringi
system may be applicable in Taiwan. Note
that the number of local Chinese workers
who can read and speak Japanese is de-
clining, especially in the Taipei area.
Thus, Japanese subsidiaries will have
difficulties in using the ringi system in the
future. The percentage of Japanese
subsidiaries using job rotation in Taiwan,
39%, is higher than in the ASEAN coun-
tries, except Singapore, 46%' The percent-
age of Japanese subsidiaries promoting lack
of dependence on a job manual, 38%,
is also higher than in the ASEAN countries,
except Singapore, 52%.
The percentage of Japanese subsidiaries
using the seniority-based promotion system
in Taiwan, 45%, is about the same as the
average for the ASEAN countries, and is
lower than that for Japanese subsidiaries
using the seniority-based wage system by
11°!c>. This may reflect the fact that, while
the seniority-based wage system may not
reduce workers' productivity [Lazear 1979J,
the seniority-based promotion is more
likely to do so, like the rigid seniority
promotion system in unionized firms in the
United States.
The percentage of Japanese subsidiaries
using group decision-making, 320/0' IS
smaller than in the ASEAN countries,
except Thailand. However, U rabe and I
got the impression, during our visit to
Taiwan in November 1983, that a variety
of group meetings are prevalent in J apa-
nese subsidiaries. The percentage of
Japanese subsidiaries promoting the mini-
mization of the status difference between
workers and managers, 300/0' is about the
same as the average for the ASEAN
countries. The percentage of Japanese
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subsidiaries using a policy of group re-
sponsibility, 22% , is higher in Taiwan than
in the ASEAN countries, except Indonesia,
but the difference is not large.
Policies adopted to reduce the number of
workers leaving the company are ranked as
follows: (1) commendations for long service,
65.9%, (2) internal promotion, 64.7°1<>,
(3) smooth human relations between workers
and managers, 64.7%, (4) continuous
training, 60.0%' (5) improvement and
expansion of welfare facilities, 50.6%,
(6) the seniority-based wage system, 45.9%,
(7) retirement payments and a pension
scheme, 43.5%, (8) small group activities,
43.5%' (9) high productivity - high wage
policy, 27.1%, (10) job rotation, 24.7%,
and (11) a scheme to encourage workers
to buy houses, 1.2%.
The percentage of the Japanese subsid-
iaries commending workers for long service
in Taiwan is similar to that in Singapore
where job hopping is a serious problem and
greater than those in other ASEAN coun-
tries. This may indicate that many Japanese
top managers of Japanese subsidiaries
believe that it is necessary, in countries
like Singapore and Taiwan where a job
hopping is a serious problem, to commend
employees for long service in their current
firm.
Many Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan
use internal promotion, which is the second
ranked policy for employment stabilization
in Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan, as well
in the ASEAN countries. However, the
percentage in Taiwan, 64.7%' is smaller
than those in the ASEAN countries, except
Thailand, 60.7°~. The figure for Singa-
pore is 77.5% which is the highest in the
ASEAN countries. The other second
ranked policy for employment stabilization
in Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan, is
smooth human relations between workers
and managers. The fourth ranked, at
60.0%, is continuous training. The top
four policies for employment stabilization
in Taiwan are exactly same as those in
Singapore, although the order differs.
The fifth ranked policy, at 50.6%, is im-
provement and expansion of welfare facili-
ties. Note that the government in Taiwan
is encouraging the improvement and ex-
pansion of welfare facilities through the law
governing employees' welfare funds.
Thus, many local firms in Taiwan are
trying to improve welfare facilities, and
consequently this policy may not be par-
ticularly effective in improving employment
stabilization III Japanese subsidiaries,
although poor welfare facilities may lead to
high labor turnover rates.
Small group activities, as a special
feature for improving productivity under
Japanese management, are being positively
promoted in Taiwan. For example, the
percentage of Japanese subsidiaries using
suggestion schemes in Taiwan is higher
than in the ASEAN countries, except the
Philippines, and that of Japanese sub-
sidiaries using QC circles in Taiwan is
higher than in all the ASEAN countries.
In addition, many Japanese subsidiaries
which are not using QC circles yet plan to
use them in the near future. This may
reflect the high quality of workers in
Taiwan in terms of education, which is one
of the major requirements for successful
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small group activities.
The percentage of Japanese subsidiaries
using a fixed salary system in Taiwan,
61.2°/~, is similar to that in Singapore,
62.5%' and the percentage of Japanese
subsidiaries using both fixed salaries and
incentive wage systems in Taiwan is 38.8%,
while that in Singapore is 35.0~o' The
figures for Taiwan and Singapore are close,
compared to those for other ASEAN
countries. The percentage of Japanese
subsidiaries using a daily-rated monthly
salary system in Taiwan, 51.8°!c>, is greater
than those in all the ASEAN countries.
This indicates that a much greater propor-
tion of Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan
belong to the manufacturing sector than in
the ASEAN countries and production
workers outnumber office workers in such
companies in Taiwan. Generally speaking,
production workers in Taiwan are paid a
daily-based monthly salary.
The percentage of Japanese subsidiaries
in Taiwan using job category as the crite-
rion for the determination of wages, 26.5%,
is greater than in all the ASEAN countries.
Thus, the method of wage determination
in Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan is
slightly closer to that of Japanese firms
in Japan than those in ASEAN countries.
A high percentage of Japanese subsidiaries
in Taiwan, 90.6%, differentiate employees'
wage increases, on the basis of job evalua-
tion. Most fringe benefits in Japanese
subsidiaries in Taiwan are better than, or
at least as good as, those in the ASEAN
countries, except overtime payment. The
average wage supplement for overtime work
in Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan, 41.5%,
can be said to be rather small, compared
with ASEAN countries, except the Philip-
pmes, 40.2~0. This might be because
many Japanese firms, about 40°!c> of J apa-
nese subsidiaries in Taiwan, set overtime
payments at about the legal minimum for
overtime payment in Taiwan, that is, 33~{,
above regular hourly wage rates. 4 )
The percentage of Japanese subsidiaries
providing retirement allowances, 90.6%,
is fairly high compared with those in the
ASEAN countries. In Taiwan, the govern-
ment compels firms to provide workers
with less than three years of service one
lTIonth's salary for each year of service, and
workers with over three years 10 days salary
for each full year of service over three years,
in addition to three months salary, when
the firm lays off workers. This rnay be
why a high percentage of Japanese subsid-
iaries provide retirement allowances in
Taiwan.
Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan pay
their workers bonuses averaging 2.6 months
salary, which is greater than those in
ASEAN countries. In Taiwan, local firms
are said to provide two months salary as
a bonus on average. It is common for
local firms to give bonuses to employees
twice a year, once before the mid-autumn
festival and once before the Chinese new
year.
The welfare facility standards of Japanese
subsidiaries in Taiwan are not generally
4) About 40% of other Japanese subsidiaries in
Taiwan set their overtime payment at 50%
above regular hourly wage rates. Note that
the legal range for overtime payments is
somewhere between 33% and 66% above the
regular hourly wage rate.
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high compared with those in ASEAN
countries. The only exceptions are provi-
sion of working uniforms and company
housing and dormitories. In particular,
the percentage of Japanese subsidiaries
having their own clinics in Taiwan is only
25.9%, while the lowest percentage in
ASEAN countries is in Singapore, that is,
49.0°,10. This may be explained by the
relatively high availability of medical and
dental services in Taiwan. Furthermore,
the percentage of Japanese subsidiaries
having their own sports facilities is only
25.9%, which is much lower than in ASEAN
countries, except Singapore, 32.7%' Ac-
cording to Yamashita, the percentage of
Japanese subsidiaries providing their own
clinics in Taiwan is lower than that of local
firms by 12 percentage points, and that of
Japanese subsidiaries having sports facilities
is lower than that of local firms by 27
percentage points [Yamashita 1980: 42J.
Moreover, according to our survey, the
percentages of Japanese subsidiaries having
company housing and dormitories, clinics,
and sports facilities in Taiwan are 42.8%,
22.40/0' and 25.90/0' respectively. On the
other hand, the percentages for local
manufacturing firms (the last item is sports
fields instead of sports facilities) in 1979
were, 64.0°,10, 31.8°,10, and 35.6%, re-
spectively [Koryu Kyokai 1982: 36]. From
these figures, one gets the impression that
Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan are neglect-
ing welfare facilities for their employees,
compared with Japanese subsidiaries III
ASEAN countries and local firms III
Taiwan. Note that, according to our inter-
views with Japanese top, and local middle,
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managers of Japanese subsidiaries in
Taiwan, generally speaking, many of them
seem to believe that the welfare facilities
of Japanese subsidiaries exceed those of
local firms, except for some large local public
firms such as China Steel. With regard
to sports facilities such as sports fields,
many of the Japanese subsidiaries whose
factories are located in the free trade zones
may have difficulty in providing sports
fields for their employees, because of
limited space.
The promotion system III Japanese sub-
sidiaries in Taiwan is not very different
from those in most of the ASEAN countries,
that is, the majority of Japanese subsidiaries
use a combination of seniority and merit
systems for promotion, while some others
use the merit system alone. The propor-
tion of Japanese subsidiaries using the
internal promotion system rather than
recruiting from outside in Taiwan, 75.30/0'
is high compared with those in ASEAN
countries. For example, the figure for
Indonesia is 75.8%' which is the highest
percentage for the .A.sEAN countries.
This figure may reflect the longer average
service of local middle managers of Japanese
subsidiaries in Taiwan. That is to say,
although the labor turnover rate is high in
Taiwan, this is especially true for young
males and females. After 30 years of age,
labor mobility drops, and this may make the
internal promotion system applicable III
Taiwan.
The two unique features of manpower
training in Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan
are: (1) a greater percentage of Japanese
subsidiaries in Taiwan send their employees
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to Japan for training and (2) the percentage
of Japanese subsidiaries using job rotation
as part of training in Taiwan is· similar to
the situation in Singapore, which has the
highest figure among the ASEAN countries.
The first feature may reflect the fact that
Taiwan is much closer to Japan in terms of
both distance and culture than the ASEAN
countries and that more local employees
in Taiwan can speak Japanese than in the
ASEAN countries. The second feature
may reflect the high educational standards
of the employees. For example, the per-
centage of workers with below primary
education in the labor force is 18.7% for
Taiwan in 1970, while the figures are
75.4°/c> for Indonesia in 1976, 88.9% for
Thailand in 1975, and 44.8% for the
Philippines in 1975 [Kaneko 1983: 116].
The percentage of Japanese subsidiaries
having labor unions in Taiwan, 54.10/0'
is not very different from those in ASEAN
countries, except Indonesia, 74.6%. Ac-
cording to the trade union law in Taiwan,
if there are a minimum of 50 employees
over 20 years of age in the same plant, those
employees are allowed to organize a union
in that plant. Considering this law, the
above figure seems low, but will rise gradu-
ally because the government is currently
encouraging workers to organize in many
plants in Taiwan. For example, employees
were organizing a union in one of these
Japanese subsidiaries we visited for inter-
views in November 1983. The majority
of the labor unions in Japanese subsidiaries
in Taiwan are enterprise unions the per-
centage of which, 56.8%, is greater than
III ASEAN countries, except Thailand,
74°/c>. This evidence may reflect the recent
government policy on industrial relations,
that is, "making the factory a family and
making the factory a school" , which
implies cooperative employer-employee re-
lations, one ilnportant good feature of
Japanese style management [Drabe and
Omura 1983: 108]. Even among Japanese
subsidiaries without any union in Taiwan,
those which do not have any place for both
employer and employees to communicate
with each other are fewer than in ASEAN
countries. For example, one Japanese
manufacturing subsidiary in the Taipei
area has quite cooperative relations with its
labor union. Unions III Taiwan are
generally not pOSItIve about discussing
wages and bonuses with the management
side. However, this trade union does
discuss wage rates and bonuses with man-
agement. Moreover, its officials investigate
whether or not the workers were satisfied
with their bonuses. A greater proportion
of Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan have
union shops than in ASEAN countries,
except the Philippines. This may be a
result of the trade union law in Taiwan,
which states that a labor union of a particu-
lar plant is allowed to force non-union
workers in that plant away from work until
they join the union.
More unions of Japanese subsidiaries
in Taiwan consist of not only laborers and
operatives, but also office workers, foremen,
engineers, and even middle managers, than
in ASEAN countries. This is a common
practice in Taiwan, as mentioned in section
II. The rate of unionization in Japanese
subsidiaries in Taiwan is higher than in the
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ASEAN countries. This may again reflect
the trade union law in Taiwan mentioned in
section II. The percentage of Japanese
subsidiaries which have experienced any
serious, or even minor, employer-employee
troubles in Taiwan is smaller than in the
ASEAN countries. This may again reflect
the prohibition of striking in Taiwan,
because of her special political situation.
Although workers are not allowed to strike
in Taiwan, they may express their dissatis-
faction by a go-slow, all giving in sick-notes,
or asking street gangs to threaten the
managers.
V Local Middle Managers'
Evaluation of Japanese
Management
The average age of the local middle
managers of Japanese subsidiaries In
Taiwan, 44.3 years, is slightly lower than
that of Japanese top managers in Taiwan,
48.5 years, and is higher than the corre-
sponding figures in the ASEAN countries.
The average length of service of local
middle managers in their current firms is
10.8 years, rather long compared with those
in the ASEAN countries, even if we take
into consideration the fact that Japanese
subsidiaries started operations in Taiwan
early, that is, in 1970 on average.
The majority of the middle managers
came to their current firms after leaving
other firms. The majority, 59.0%, came
from local private firms, 18.9% from
government offices, 14.8% from other
Japanese firms, and only 6.6% from Ameri-
can firms, whose wage rates and working
hours are, respectively, higher and shorter
than those of Japanese subsidiaries.
vVhile little chance of learning new tech-
nology is the most frequent reason why the
local middle managers of Japanese sub-
sidiaries left their previous organizations,
more chance of learning new technology is
the most frequent reason why they chose
to work for their current firms. This may
indicate that new technology in Japanese
subsidiaries, especially, quality and produc-
tion control, are evaluated by local middle
managers very highly. Quality and pro-
duction control are considered to be fairly
advanced in Japanese companies in general
[Yoshihara 1984: 241-246].
The second and third most frequent
reasons why local middle managers chose
their current firms are better working
conditions and the good reputation of their
current firms. More than half the local
middle managers gave these reasons.
Most of the local middle managers of
Japanese subsidiaries we interviewed have
the impression that the working hours in
Japanese subsidiaries are not so long as
those in local firms. This may be why they
say working conditions are better In
Japanese subsidiaries than in local firms.
The relatively good reputation of Japanese
subsidiaries in Taiwan (better than in the
ASEAN countries) may reflect the historical
close relations between Japan and Taiwan.
The local middle managers of Japanese
subsidiaries in ASEAN countries do not
evaluate these features of Japanese firms
so highly as those in Taiwan.
The fourth reason for choosing their
current firms is stable employment. Only
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about one third of the local middle managers
in Taiwan gave this reason. On the other
hand, they did not give better status or
position, better prospects of advancement,
and higher salary or wages in their current
Japanese subsidiaries much weight. This
indicates that, from the local middle
managers' viewpoint, Japanese subsidiaries
in Taiwan are not significantly attractive
in terms of promotion and wage system.
According to the Japanese top and local
middle managers we interviewed, the wage
rates of Japanese subsidiaries are lower than
those of American ones by 20% and higher
than or equal to those of local firms.
A higher percentage of local middle
managers of Japanese subsidiaries III
Taiwan, 61.0°!c> , are sent to Japan for
training than in the ASEAN countries.
Furthermore, if we add the local middle
managers who are sent to Japan as a reward
for their services to their current firms on
which information is not available, a much
higher percentage of local middle managers
of Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan were
sent to Japan than III the ASEAN
countries.
The local middle managers of Japanese
subsidiaries in Taiwan who said that they
were very proud of working for their
companies amounted to only 30.8% of the
respondents, which is well below the figure
for the ASEAN countries, the lowest of
which was 61% in Indonesia. On the
other hand, about half of the local middle
managers in Taiwan said that their current
companies had a good reputation. Those
who said that they were not proud of their
companies comprised 21.7% of the re-
spondents, while the percentages in all the
ASEAN countries are zero or almost zero.
Next, 73.40/0 of the local managers in
Taiwan say that they are definitely com-
mitted to their companies, which is higher
than in the ASEAN countries. These
two answers show that the majority of local
middle managers of Japanese subsidiaries
in Taiwan are not very proud of working
for their companies but definitely do what
they ought to do for them. Thus, the
majority seem to be very practical and
individualistic. This may lead to the
answers to Question 46, "Do you think
that job descriptions specifying each job's
authority and responsibility in detail should
be made available to local staff?", to which
90.6% answered yes. The pattern of
answers to Questions 17 and 18, "Do you
have a feeling of participation in the
management of this company?" and "What
type of management, would you say, pre-
vails in this company, authoritative man-
agement or participative management?",
show the great similarities between Taiwan
and Singapore. That is to say, in both
countries, less than half the local middle
managers of Japanese subsidiaries feel that
they participate strongly in the manage-
ment of their companies, and more than
half say that authoritative (top-down)
management prevails in their companies.
Since the majority of local middle managers
of Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan feel
that the management of their companies
is authoritative, it is more than likely that
the local workers will feel the same.
The proportion of local middle managers
of Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan who
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said that there were some communication
barriers between Japanese staff and local
staff in their companies is similar to those
in most of the ASEAN countries. Since
more Taiwanese local middle managers
can speak Japanese, one might expect that
the language barrier in Taiwan would be
relatively less important than III the
ASEAN countries. According to our sur-
vey, however, half the Taiwanese local
middle managers of Japanese subsidiaries
chose the language barrier as one of the
three most important communication
barriers. The language barrier in Taiwan
is not only the most important barrier but
also considered as important, or even more
important, than in the ASEAN countries.
The second most important barrier is that
Japanese management is geared too much
to the head office in Japan, 30.6%' and this
may reflect the fact that many Japanese
subsidiaries are fully owned by Japanese.
The third most important barrier is value
differences, 28.5%, This may reflect the
fact that Japanese staff seem to be impatient
from local staff's point of view. The
fourth most important barrier is differences
in customs, but only 20.2°~ of the re-
spondents chose this answer. Other bar-
riers are, no personal relations outside the
workshop between Japanese and local
staff, Japanese staff's short stay in Taiwan,
and Japanese staff tendency to form a
closed and exclusive circle, each chosen by
about 20% or less of the respondents.
Thus, these barriers are not considered very
important in Taiwan.
The 57.1o~ of local middle managers in
Taiwan who think that Japanese staff are
willing to transfer new technology or man-
agement know-how through on-the-job
training are more numerous than in the
ASEAN countries, except the Philippines,
60.5~~. This answer is consistent with
the previous answers, that is, more chances
of learning new technology.
The percentage of the local middle
managers of Japanese subsidiaries III
Taiwan who say that they rarely observe
job hopping among their acquaintances,
41.40/0' is higher than in the ASEAN
countries, except Thailand, 52.3%' How-
ever, the percentage who say that they
think job hopping is perfectly natural and
OK is 48.6°~, while the highest figure in the
ASEAN countries is in the Philippines,
15.8°~. Furthermore, if we add those who
think that job hopping is undesirable but
justified to the above answers, we will see
that about 800~ of local middle managers
think that job hopping is perfectly natural
or, at least, justified. This result may
reflect the lack of separation between the
owners and the managers of local firms in
Taiwan, and the fact that there is almost
no chance of local middle managers in
Taiwan becoming top managers, unless
they are the owners, their relatives, or their
acquaintances. This figure is much higher
than in the ASEAN countries, and may
explain why job hopping is considered a
serious problem in Taiwan. For example,
only 6.1% of the local middle managers of
Japanese subsidiaries in Singapore, where
job hopping is a serious problem, said that
job hopping was perfectly natural and OK.
This may become a bottleneck of the high
technology transfer through transnational
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corporations to Taiwan in the future.
According to our survey, middle manag-
ers' satisfaction with their pay is not very
different in Taiwan and the ASEAN
countries. However, the percentages of
local middle managers in Taiwan who said
that they are very satisfied with job re-
sponsibility, relations with their chiefs, and
relations with their peer group are 36.6%,
42.4%, and 33.3%, respectively, generally
much lower than those in ASEAN countries.
Moreover, the percentage of local middle
managers of Japanese subsidiaries III
Taiwan who are very satisfied with their
prospects of advancement is not high,
compared with those in ASEAN countries.
We may thus argue that more local middle
managers of Japanese subsidiaries III
Taiwan are not very satisfied with the above
aspects of their companies, compared with
those in the ASEAN countries.
The percentage of local middle man-
agers of Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan
regularly participating in regular manage-
ment meetings, 68.3°t!a, is higher than in the
ASEAN countries, and their average at-
tendance rate is higher than in ASEAN
countries, except the Philippines. More-
over, the percentage of the local middle
managers of Japanese subsidiaries III
Taiwan who said that they often found
ample opportunities to voice their opinions
on management decisions is much higher
than in ASEAN countries. Thus, in terms
of management policy, they seem to be
relatively more satisfied with their com-
panies, compared with local middle man-
agers in ASEAN countries. These figures
are not consistent with the percentage of
middle managers who said that authoritative
management prevails in their companies,
that is, 53.6<jo'
On the other hand, the percentage of the
local middle managers of Japanese sub-
sidiaries in Taiwan who have regular group
meetings with their subordinates, 43.6%,
is lower than in ASEAN countries, except
Thailand, 39.5%. This indicates that local
middle managers do not pay much attention
to the opinions of their subordinates, in
that they listen to their subordinates'
opinions at regular meetings less frequently
than those in ASEAN countries, except
Thailand. The primary purpose of group
meetings in Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan,
according to local middle managers, are
problem solving, 88.7%, goal-setting,
59.9<;6, and socialization, 42.3%.
There is a very interesting pattern to the
answers of the local middle managers of
Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan to Question
34, "Do you think that these group meetings
should be held only within normal working
hours?". The percentage of those who
answered yes is 42.8% in Taiwan, but in
ASEAN countries is generally much lower.
And the percentage of those who answered
no is 30.4% in Taiwan, but in ASEAN
countries is zero or almost zero. These
figures show that, in Taiwan, there is a
dichotomy in the local middle managers'
opinions on whether or not group meetings
are part of regular work. Individualism
is considered to be very strong among them,
but most, 98.6%, do agree with encouraging
team work to achieve group objectives
rather than individual performance, as do
those in the ASEAN countries. Further-
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more, according to our survey, most of the
local middle managers in Taiwan feel that,
if a colleague should suddenly fall sick, it is
their duty to look after his work, 71.5°~,
or say that they are happy to help a friend
in an emergency, 23.6°~.
The incentives which the local middle
managers of Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan
think are important in motivating local
workers to improve productivity are, ex-
cellent leadership encouraging team work,
money incentives, and job enrichment or
making jobs interesting. Most, 92.9%'
disagree with merely using the seniority
rule as the criterion for promotion.
According to our survey, all the local
middle managers of Japanese subsidiaries
in Taiwan offer friendly counselling to their
subordinates on their private affairs as well
as job related matters, and they do so 5.6
times a month on average, which is higher
than the figures for the ASEAN countries,
except Thailand, 9.7 times a month.
Moreover, if they found an employee
incapable or unfit for the job, 74.3% said
they would transfer him to another job in
the same company, and 11.9% that they
would find him a job in another company.
Just a small percentage said they would
either press him to resign or fire him, and
this indicates that the majority are pater-
nalistic. Thus, on average, the local
middle managers of Japanese subsidiaries
in Taiwan care about their subordinates
more than those in ASEAN countries. We
should, however, note that, according to
our interviews with Japanese top managers
in Taiwan, many of them feel that the
local middle managers in their companies
do not really care about their subordinates.
According to our survey, most of the
local middle managers of Japanese sub-
sidiaries in Taiwan think that the managers
should try to make as many opportunities
to communicate with the ord.inary workers
as possible. Concretely, only 27.9% think
that managers should be given their own
private offices, and the percentages of those
who like to participate in games or club
activities and the annual dinner party
sponsored by the company or the recrea-
tional committee are 82.4°~ and 95.8%,
respectively. Furthermore, the percentage
of the local middle managers in Taiwan who
have lunch with workers in the company
canteen is 87.0%, which is higher than
m the ASEAN countries, except the
Philippines, 89.4%' Most of the local
middle managers in Taiwan, 95.7%, think
it is not necessary for managers to be
provided with a company restaurant sepa-
rated from the canteen for workers. From
these figures, we may argue that the ideas
of the local middle managers of Japanese
subsidiaries in Taiwan on mensualization
are not very different from those in the
ASEAN countries. Moreover, from the
above answers, one may argue that the
local middle managers of Japanese subsid-
iaries in Taiwan are distinguishing more op-
portunities for the managers to communi-
cate with the workers by minimizing the
status difference between them. They
agree with the first opinion but not neces-
sarily the latter.
The percentage of the local middle
managers in Taiwan who think that job
descriptions specifying authority and
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responsibility in detail should be made
available to local staff, 90.6%' is higher
than in all the ASEAN countries. This
may be related to many Japanese subsidiar-
ies' policy of relying little on job manuals
and the local middle managers' preference
for a clear and detailed description of their
job.
The main features of their companies'
management with which local managers are
satisfied are, "even top managers mix with
workers", '~good chance to learn technology
and know~how", "good human relations
between Japanese and local staff", and
"good team spirit prevails", in that order.
Then comes, "the status difference be-
tween managers and workers is very small".
These are exactly the same as those in
Singapore, although the order differs.
However, the local middle managers in
Taiwan do not highly evaluate career
advancement, no severe punishment for
mistakes or failures, and no lay-offs. Of
course, these results do not indicate that
the local middle managers think that their
companies should use lay-offs and severe
punishment for mistakes or failures.
Local middle managers consider the
major weak points of the management of
their companies are, no clear responsibility
for individuals, poor training opportunities,
and slow decision-making, in that order.
On the other hand, only 14.6°k think that
poor chances of promotion is one of the weak
points of their companies' management.
Thus, although only 14.6% of the local
middle managers think that good chances
of career advancement is one of the most
satisfying features of their companies'
management, the majority of the remainder
do not think that poor chances of promotion
is one of its weak points. Only 15.3°k
of the local middle managers chose to work
for their current companies because of
better prospects of advancement. We may
thus argue that, although the majority of
the local middle managers of Japanese
subsidiaries in Taiwan do not expect good
chances of career advancement in their
current companies, they are not exceedingly
disappointed about promotion either.
As mentioned above, slow decision-mak-
ing is considered one of the weak points
of their companies' management by 31.1%
of the local middle managers in Taiwan.
However, 91.2% welcome the consensus
approach to decision-making in Japanese
management. Thus the consensus ap-
proach to decision-making is still favored
by most of the local middle managers of
Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan, as well as
those III the ASEAN countries. The
percentage of the local middle managers
in Taiwan who strongly favor opportunities
for job rotation, 87.40/0' is higher than in
the ASEAN countries, and the percentage
who think that even the workers should be
given the chance of job rotation, 82.4%,
is high and not very different from those
for the ASEAN countries. These results
show that most of the local middle managers
of Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan have a
positive attitude towards job rotation.
These attitudes suggest that local middle
managers of Japanese subsidiaries III
Taiwan think that good opportunities to
learn technology and know-how, such as
quality and production control, is one of the
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most satisfying features of their com-
panies' management. According to our
survey, in Taiwan the percentage of Japa-
nese subsidiaries actually practicing job
rotation is only 39%' Thus, promoting
job rotation may improve the satisfaction
of local middle managers and workers in
Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan, although
the extent to which job rotation can be
practiced may be limited because of the
specific characteristics of each industry,
and the law governing firms and factories.
VI Concluding Remarks
From local middle managers' evaluations
of management of Japanese subsidiaries
III Taiwan, we may conclude that the
majority think that their chances of learn-
ing technology and management know-
how, such as quality and production control,
are good in Japanese subsidiaries. Since
Japanese companies which have advanced
technology and know-how are more likely
to succeed in direct investment abroad,
the local middle managers of Japanese
subsidiaries in Taiwan are well aware what
really are the good features of Japanese
subsidiaries.
It is difficult for us to understand what
the local middle managers of Japanese
subsidiaries really think. For example, for
our survey we may conclude that most of
the local middle managers are very practical
and individualistic. On the other hand,
they care about their subordinates more than
their counterparts in the ASEAN countries.
And there are other inconsistencies in their
replies.
Although many Japanese subsidiaries in
Taiwan pursue employment stabilization
policy, the local middle managers do not
necessarily appreciate these very much,
probably because of the tight labor market
III Taiwan. The local middle managers
do not necessarily support Japanese sub-
sidiaries' minimization of the status differ-
ence between workers and managers, while
they do support efforts to provide more
opportunities for managers to communicate
with workers. This may reflect the fact
that they themselves belong to the manager
class and perhaps desire to be distinguished
from the ordinary workers.
Greater use of job rotation and on-the-job
training may increase local middle man-
agers' satisfaction, although some limita-
tions on the extent of job rotation exist.
Although many Japanese top and local
middle managers of Japanese subsidiaries
III Taiwan think that the welfare facilities
III Japanese subsidiaries are better than
those in local firms, the fact is that the
welfare facilities of the local firms exceed
those of Japanese subsidiaries. There
thus seems to be room for Japanese sub-
sidiaries to improve their welfare facilities.
Currently the government of Taiwan is
promoting cooperative industrial relations,
that is, "making the factory a family and
making the factory a school". This is
exactly one of the most important good
features of Japanese industrial relations.
Thus, Japanese subsidiaries may have room
to contribute to industrial relations 111
Taiwan, through the improvement of
industrial relations and the establishments
of cooperative relations between the workers
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and the managers in their firms.
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